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Reapportionment, Gerrymanders,
and the Notion of "Compactness"
Joseph E. Schwartzberg*
The frequency of recent reapportionment decisions has in-
creased public concern for voting equality.' As legislative districts
become more equally populated within a state through legislative
and judicial action, attention will likely turn to combating the
gerrymander.? Antigerrymandering prohibitions have been on the
books, at both federal3 and state4 levels, for well over a century;
but enforcement has generally been lax or nonexistent.5 A bill
introduced in the 89th Congress attempting to curtail use of the
*Associate Professor of Geography, University of Minnesota. The author
wishes to express his appreciation to his colleagues, Professor Thomas M.
Scott of the Department of Political Science and Professors Philip Porter
and Fred Lukermann of the Department of Geography at the University of
Minnesota, to the former for suggesting several of the references cited in this
article and to all three for their critical reading of the original manuscript and
suggestions for its improvement.
1. See, e.g., Silva, Apportionment in New York, So FORMHAr L. REV. 581
(1962). See also McCloskey, The Supreme Court, 1961 Term, Forword: The
Reapportionment Case, 76 HARv. L. RPv. 54 (1962).
2. The abuse appears to be much older than the term. The device appar-
ently was first used in America in 1705. GRIFFrrI, THE RISE ma DEvnwp-
MENT OF THE GEnRaymmER 21, 26-27 (1907). The gerrymander still exists.
Despite numerous reapportionment decisions since 1962, the latest map of
congressional districts depicts numerous examples. See the map published by
the United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, entitled
"Congressional Districts for the 89th Congress" (1962).
3. From 1842 to 1929 "Congress set varying requirements for . .. con-
tiguity and compactness of district territory and equal populations 'as nearly
as practicable'.... But in effect, the antigerrymandering requirements had
never been enforced." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol. XXII,
No. 12, March 19, 1965, p. 420.
4. E.g., ILL. CONST. art. 4, § 6 provides: "All senatorial districts shall be
formed of contiguous and compact territory." Section 7 provides: "Repre-
sentative districts shall be formed of contiguous and compact territory.... ",
Mo. CoNsT. art. 3, § 3 provides: "When any county is entitled to more than
one representative... the body authorized ... shall divide the county into
districts of contiguous territory, as compact and nearly equal in population
as may be.... ." Section 5 provides: "For the election of Senators, the state
shall be divided into convenient districts of contiguous territory, as compact,
and nearly equal in population as may be."
5. BRooKS, Po ITICA. PARTIES AND ELECTORAL PROBTIxM 476 (1923).
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gerrymander requires, among other things, that congressional
districts be composed of contiguous territory in compact form."
Such a districting requires objective standards based in part on a
meaningful definition of "compactness." Present and proposed
legislative definitions of compactness are generally nothing more
than definitions of fairness.1 This comment presents a simple,
objective, and workable definition of compactness and a reason-
able standard for its application. This definition and this proposed
standard are suitable for guiding legislatures in the districting
process or for assisting courts in adjudicating disputes arising from
alleged abuses under existing districting statutes. If used they
would greatly reduce gerrymanders and place the burden of justi-
fying a noncompact district on the legislature.
For any given two dimensional area the most compact shape
is a circle. No other geometric figure has as low a ratio between
its perimeter and area. The relative compactness of any other
figure may be determined by finding the ratio of its perimeter to
the perimeter of a circle of equal area. The ratio serves as an
index of compactness. The index number of a circle is taken to
be one. All other indices are higher and represent varying degrees
of departure from perfect compactness. Thus, the index number
of a perfect square is 1.13, of an equilateral triangle 1.29, and of a
perfect five point star 1.95.8
While determining the index of compactness for simple geo-
metric figures is easy, the complex, irregular figures formed by
actual electoral districts normally present greater problems. Cur-
6. H.R. 5505, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). This was one of four main
sections of the bill. The others provided for a maximum population deviation
of 15% from the mean population of all the districts in the state; prohibited
at large elections in all states having more than one representative; and
forbade redistricting more than once each decade. See Congressional Quar-
terly Weekly Report, Vol. XXII, No. 11, March 12, 1965, p. 404.
7. The House Judiciary Committee Report on the Celler Bill found com-
pactness to be the absence of any attempt:
1. To divide (a territorial unit) into election districts in an unnatural
and unfair way with the purpose of giving one political party an elec-
toral majority in a large number of districts while concentrating the
voting strength of the opposition in as few districts as possible. 2. To
divide (an area) into political units in an unnatural and unfair way
with the purpose of giving special advantages to one group.
H.R. REP. No. 140, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965).
8. Thus, for example, a square with sides of 6 inches would have a
perimeter of 24 inches and an area of 36 square inches. A circle of the same
area (36 square inches) would have a circumference of 21.28 inches. The ratio
of the 24 inch perimeter of the square to the 21.28 inch perimeter of the circle
of equal area is 1.13.
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vatures or extensions created by natural boundaries such as me-
andering streams may make it exceedingly difficult to determine
the compactness of a district. For example, a basically square
district, appearing on a small scale map to have twenty-five mile
sides, might on one side have a tortuous riverine boundary well
over one hundred miles long. Thus, its measurable perimeter
would be closer to two hundred than to one hundred miles, and
its index of compactness would be almost doubled. In order to
avoid such spurious findings, it is necessary in practice to focus
upon the gross dimension of shape, not on the minute irregulari-
ties.
There are a number of ways to determine the gross perimeter
of an electoral district and thus determine its index of compact-
ness. The method put forward here involves first determining the
constituent units forming the district. They may be city blocks,
wards, townships, counties, or areas arbitrarily bounded by high-
ways, natural boundaries, and so forth. Next the "trijunctions"9
of those constituent units lying along the perimeter of the district
are marked on a map of suitable scale for accurate measurement
of the intervening distances."0 The distances along straight lines
connecting adjacent trijunctions are then measured. Their total
length constitutes the gross perimeter of the district.
Examination of the congressional districts of North Carolina
as apportioned for the 89th Congress illustrates the proposed
method."' Figure 1 (see Appendix) shows the state with its con-
gressional districts and constituent counties. Figure 2 illustrates
the 382 mile gross perimeter of the First Congressional District
of North Carolina. When this perimeter is compared with the
circumference of a circle of the same area as the true area of the
district,'2 the ratio of the perimeters of the two figures is 1.14.
9. A "trijunction" is defined as a point at which any three given areas
meet. A perimeter trijunction is normally the point at which two constituent
units of a district meet an adjoining district, or another state, or territorial
water, or a foreign county. But a trijunction exists also where one county
meets territorial water and a state, or two states.
10. The smaller the districts the larger the requisite map scale. For most
congressional districts, except in urban or suburban areas, a scale of 1:1,000,000
(roughly 16 miles to the inch) will suffice. For districts formed in urban areas
a scale of 1:25,000 (roughly two-fifths of a mile to the inch) may be required.
11. North Carolina is a good example because it has a fairly large number
of attenuated districts; furthermore, being a coastal state, it affords an oppor-
tunity to demonstrate the mechanics of the system in such a situation.
12. The area within the gross perimeter, the gross area, will deviate some-
what from the actual area of the district. Since the gross area in most instances
will closely approximate the true area, which is already available, it seems
1966]
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This index number as shown in Table A is smaller than the index
of compactness of any other district in the state.' Figure 3 shows
the gross perimeter of all eleven districts.' 4
TABrz A
Area, Gross Perimeter, Index of Compactness, Population and Deviation
from Mean Population of Congressional Districts of North Carolina
as Apportioned for the Eighty-Ninth Congress
1960 % Deviation
No. of Total Area Gross Peri- Index of Population from Mean
District (Sq..i.)* meter (Mi.) Compactness (1,000's) Population
1 8,909 882 1.14 278 -32.9
2 8,991 429 1.92 850 -15.5
8 7,561 519 1.68 430 + 8.9
4 4,265 431 1.86 461 +11.4
5 4,184 458 1.97 454 + 9.7
6 1,782 190 1.27 487 +17.6
7 5,31 830 1.29 449 + 8.5
8 4,006 446 1.99 491 +18.6
9 4,174 489 1.91 404 - 2.4
10 2,769 880 2.04 890 - 5.8
11 5,890 898 1.46 861 -12.8
Total 52,712 4,556
Average 4,792 1.68 414 12.7**
*Land plus inland water
**+ or - sign ignored in computing this average
Having a means of measuring compactness, we can turn to
the problem of determining a maximum acceptable deviation from
perfect compactness. Of course, any maximum figure chosen will
be arbitrary, just as the often proposed figure of fifteen per cent
maximum deviation from average population for congressional
districts15 is arbitrary. Inspection of the map of congressional
districts for the 89th Congress in general, and of the districts of
North Carolina in particular, plus experimentation with various
index numbers (1.5, 1.75, and 2.0) leads me to suggest that indices
of compactness up to 1.67 should be considered reasonable. Dis-
reasonable when determining compactness to use the gross perimeter with the
true area. But, should it be desired, the gross area could be computed
trigonometrically.
13. Table A also shows the populations of the several districts and their
departure from the state average. It is evident that the oddly-shaped districts
were not generally created to achieve equal populations.
14. A larger map at a scale of 23.6 miles to the inch was used for the
measurements in Table A. For official purposes a still larger scale would be
recommended.
15. See, e.g., H.R. 5505, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
[Vol. 50:443
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tricts with higher indices would then be classified as "noncompact"
and unsatisfactory. 6 A state may, however, choose a different
maximum index of campactness.
Figure 4 presents a possible redistricting of North Carolina in
such a way as to obtain districts having (1) deviations of not over
15 per cent from the average district population and (2) indices of
compactness not over 1.67. This redistricting manages, addition-
ally, to retain the largest town presently in each district. To
achieve the result depicted it was necessary to reassign only
twelve of the state's one hundred counties. Probably no smaller
shift of territory could have achieved these results. Table B shows
the index of compactness and the deviation from mean population
for the districts of Figure 4. The average index is reduced from
1.68 to 1.45 and the average population deviation from 12.7 per
cent to 8.3 per cent.17 Presumably comparable results could be
obtained by any state legislature where the need for redistricting
arises.
TABz B
Area, Gross Perimeter, Index of Compactness, Population and Deviation
from Mean Population of Congressional Districts of North Carolina
as Per Suggested Reapportionment with Minimal Boundary Shifts
1960 % Deviation
No. of Total Area Gross Per- Index of Population from Mean
District (Sq. Mi.)* meter (Mi.) Compactness (1,000's) Population
1 10,587 482 1.18 877 - 8.7
2 5,085 378 1.48 444 + 7.2
3 6,678 406 1.40 894 - 5.1
4 3,472 840 1.63 476 +15.0
5 2,827 312 1.66 856 - 9.2
6 1,483 177 1.80 875 - 9.4
7 5,281 880 1.29 449 + 8.5
8 8,842 847 1.58 476 +15.0
9 4,540 840 1.44 863 - 1.4
10 2,857 295 1.56 405 - 2.2
11 6,110 889 1.40 875 - 9.4
Total 52,712 4,556
Average 4,792 1.45 414 8.8**
*Land plus inland water
**+ or - sign ignored in computing this average
Creating a maximum index of compactness transfers the
burden of proof in a dispute over the legality of district bound-
16. The North Carolina districts so classified, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, and 10, are
shaded in a dark tone in Figure 3.
17. See Table A.
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aries from the attacking party to the apportioning legislature.
Attenuated districts would be acceptable if the legislature demon-
strated reliance on factors sufficient to override the general policy
of compactness or in cases in which the shape of the state might
make the creation of compact districts difficult, if not impossible.
For the latter possibility, Cape Cod and Long Island provide cases
in point'U But, as most states are quite compact, such cases should
be rare. Of the 435 existing congressional districts the compact-
ness of only a dozen or so appear to me to be affected to a signifi-
cant degree by the shape of the state. Significantly, in North
Carolina the Eleventh District is the one most adversely affected
by the shape of the state; yet it is one of the four districts classi-
fied as compact.
It is not imagined that the proposed law or any other law
providing for the creation of compact electoral districts of equal
population will automatically bring an end to gerrymandering.
However, effective laws could greatly restrict the latitude for
manipulation of district boundaries toward such an end and
reduce the number and magnitude of abuses.
18. A state legislature cannot control the shape of Cape Cod or Long
Island. Therefore in such cases there is no impropriety when natural boundaries
dictate noncompact electoral districts. Similar problems may arise where
statutes stipulate that electoral districts shall be comprised of already existing
single constituent units. If one of these units is elongated (Apache County,
Arizona, is such a possible unit), the legislature should not be censured for
allowing such a noncompact district to remain.
[Vol. 50:443
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NORTH CAROLINA
FIRST CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT
.. o., Segments of "Gross Perimeter" and defining
Tri-junctions
-Segments of Actual Perimeter where
different from above
-- County boundaries and coastlines
Fig. 9
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